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1. Methodological contributions of Piketty’s “Capital…” 
When discussing “Capital in the 21st century” we need to distinguish 
between its analytics and methodology, its recommendations, and its forecasts. 
One can agree with analytics without agreeing with the recommendations, or the 
reverse.  The methodology introduced by “Capital…”, because it seems to fit quite 
well the likely evolution of the rich world in the decades to come, and more 
importantly because it provides a novel way to look at economic phenomena, is  
probably the most significant contribution of the book. It will affect not only how 
we think of income distribution and capitalism in the future but also how we think 
about economic history, from the Ancient Rome to pre-revolutionary France. (In 
effect, we can already see some of these developments).   
 The most important methodological contribution of Piketty’s book is his 
attempt at the unification of the fields of economic growth, functional income 
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distribution and personal income distribution.2 In the standard Walrasian system, 
the three are formally related, but in the actual work in economics they were 
generally treated separately, or even simply left out. Functional income 
distribution was studied much more by Marxist economists.  Neoclassical 
economists tended to assume that capital and labor shares were broadly fixed. 
This view changed only fairly recently and we are now witnessing an upsurge of 
interest in the topic (Karabarbunis  and Neiman 2013; Elsby, Hobijn and Şahin 
2013). Piketty’s emphasis on the rising share of capital income contributed to this 
efflorescence.  
Personal income distribution trended to be studied almost as divorced from 
the rest of economics because in a Walrasian world agents come to the market 
with already given endowments of capital and labor. Since the original 
distribution of these endowments is not the subject of the study (as narrowly 
defined in economics), personal income distribution was assumed to be whatever 
the market generates. But in “Capital..” the movements in the capital-income 
ratio, driven by “the fundamental inequality” r>g (return on capital greater than 
the growth rate of overall income)3,  lead to the  rising share of capital income in 
net product and this in turn leads to a greater inter-personal inequality.   
This paper concentrated on the last point—implicitly taken for granted: 
greater share of capital is associated, it is thought, with a rising inter-personal 
inequality. This view is understandable because during most of economic history 
people with high capital income were also people with high overall income. 
Therefore, a greater share of net product going to capitalists came to be 
associated with greater inter-personal inequality. Yet the link is not as simple and 
unambiguous as it seems. Even when the positive relationship between the two 
exists, the strength of that relationship varies.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in general the link 
between the rising share of capital in net income (Piketty’s α) and Gini coefficient 
of inter-personal income inequality. Section 3 looks at this relationship in three 
ideal-typical societies: socialist, classical capitalist and “new” capitalist. (The terms 
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3 
 
are defined there). It also draws on some empirical examples from the advanced 
economies.  Section 4 presents policy implications. 
It may be useful, even before we embark on the study of the relationship 
between α and Gini, to indicate why this is important. The increase in α is not, by 
itself, a “problem” if it does not lead to an increase in inequality between 
individuals. In effect, when the underlying distribution of capital is egalitarian, an 
increase in α may cause a decrease in inter-personal inequality or leave it 
unchanged. Hence, even for the proponents of strong egalitarianism, the increase 
in capital share cannot be a problem as such. It becomes a “problem” only 
because in most of real-world situations the underlying distribution of capital 
assets is extremely skewed. The realization of this fact leads me, in the 
prescriptive part, to argue in favor of equalization of ownership of assets amongst 
individuals. This provides a realistic agenda for fighting inequality and is especially 
relevant for the rich societies where increasing wealth/income ratio implies that, 
unless the return on capital decreases sufficiently, a greater share of national net 
product will be received by asset-holders. Thus we have a choice between 
acquiescing in the rising inter-personal inequality, trying to reduce it through 
taxation, or working on the deconcentration of asset ownership. 
Focusing on the distribution of assets is, in my opinion, a more promising 
policy than Piketty’s emphasis on taxation of capital. But regardless of whether 
one tool is better than the other, they are two complementary ways to address 
rising inequality  in the ever more affluent societies (that is, in societies with a 
rising K/Y ratio).   
 
2. Going from functional to personal income distribution 
The main link between functional and personal income distribution is 
provided by the relationship r>g. But in order to lead to a rising inter-personal 
inequality it needs however to satisfy the three following requirements. 
First, r must be overwhelmingly used for investment, and not for 
consumption, Clearly, if all of r was simply consumed by capitalists, the K/Y ratio 
in the next cycle will remain unchanged, and dynamically there would be no 
increase in either β=K/Y or in the share of total income derived by capital (α). This 
4 
 
the point on which Debraj Ray in his critique of “Capital…” has strongly insisted.  4 
It is indeed a formally correct argument, but misses the entire point of what 
capitalism and capitalists are. If capitalists were interested solely in consumption, 
in spending most of their income in what Adam Smith beautifully termed 
“baubles and trinkets”, the process would play out as Ray imagines. But capitalists 
are precisely capitalists because they do not consume all surplus, are interested in 
expanding the scope of their operations, and thus in investing all or most of r.  
The assumption of saving rate out of r being close to 1 is not only well-founded in 
the precedents from theoretical economics (in modern times, from Kalecki 1942, 
Solow 1956 and Kaldor 1957 onwards, and obviously all the way back to Ricardo 
and Marx) but is equally well-founded in the empirical behavior of the rich, and in 
what are the central features of capitalism as a system. 5  
But the rising α does not ensure by itself transmission into greater inter-
personal inequality. For this to happen, concentration of capital income has to be 
very high. Working with only two factor incomes, that of labor and capital, for the 
overall inequality of personal income to go up, the requirement is that the more 
unequally distributed source has to grow relatively to the less unequally 
distributed source. With capital income, this condition is relatively easily satisfied 
since in all known cases, the concentration of capital income is greater than the 
concentration of labor income. In the US, for example, Gini of income from capital 
(calculated across household per capita incomes) is around 80, while similarly 
calculated Gini of labor income is around 40. The situation is identical in other 
countries. This is simply a reflection of the well-known concentration of capital 
assets and of the fact that 30 to 40 percent of Americans have zero no capital 
assets, and hence draw no income from ownership. 
The third requirement is that the association between capital-rich and 
overall income-rich people be high. A simple high concentration of a given income 
source will not guarantee that that source contributes to inequality. 
Unemployment benefits have a Gini which is generally in excess of 90 (since most 
people receive no unemployment benefits during any given year), but since 
recipients of unemployment benefits are generally income-poor, an increase in 
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5 For this point see Milanovic (2014) critique of Debraj Ray’s critique of Piketty.  
5 
 
the share of unemployment benefits in total income reduces income inequality. 
Technically, the third requirement is (in the case of Gini coefficient with which we 
work here) expressed in the form of a high correlation between rankings 
according to capital income and rankings according to total income. Put simply, 
this requirement means that people who receive large capital incomes should 
also be rich. Empirically, this requirement is easily satisfied in most countries. 
It is thus precisely because we tend to take as given 
(1) high saving out of capital income,  
(2) high concentration among owners of capital, and  
(3) high correlation between one’s drawing a large capital income and 
being rich 
that we tend to see the transmission from a rising capital income share into 
an increasing inter-personal inequality as a foregone conclusion. But this is not 
always so, or at least the strength of the transmission is variable. 
We know that total income Gini can be decomposed into inequalities 
contributed by each income source, in our case capital (c) and labor (l) as in (1):  
𝐺 = 𝑠𝑙𝑅𝑙𝐺𝑙 + 𝑠𝑐𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐                      (1)  
where si = share of a given income (i-th) source, Ri = correlation ratio between the 
source and total income, Gi = Gini coefficient of an income source, and G = overall 
income Gini.  Ri in turn is equal to the ratio of two correlation coefficients (ρ’s), 
namely, between income source and recipients’ ranks (from the poorest to the 
richest) according to total income and according to income source itself. For 
capital income, c, the correlation ratio can be written: 
𝑅𝑐 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟(𝑦), 𝑐)
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟(𝑐), 𝑐)
=
𝜌(𝑟(𝑦), 𝑐)𝜎𝑟(𝑦)𝜎𝑐
𝜌(𝑟(𝑐), 𝑐)𝜎𝑟(𝑐)𝜎𝑐
=
𝜌(𝑟(𝑦), 𝑐)
𝜌(𝑟(𝑐), 𝑐)
       (2) 
Notice that if people’s ranks according to total income and income from 
capital coincide, Rc=1. In all other cases,  𝜌(𝑟(𝑦), 𝑐) < 𝜌(𝑟(𝑐), 𝑐) and Rc<1.  For 
unemployment benefits mentioned above Ri<0.  
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For the rising share of capital income (sc) to increase overall income Gini, 
we need therefore to have two “transmission” tools, Gini coefficient of capital 
income and Rc, positive and high. 6 
The rest of the paper will deal with these two “transmission” tools. 
Equation (2) gives the definition of Rc, while the definition of Gc is a standard one, 
with the Gini coefficient calculated across the entire sample but with individuals 
ranked by their amount of capital income (rather than by total income as we 
normally do in calculations of overall income Gini). 
 
3. Transmission of higher capital income into personal inequality: three social 
systems 
It is useful to consider three ideal-typical social systems and to observe how 
they “transmit” an increased share of income from capital into personal income 
distribution.  
Socialism. We assume that in socialism returns from capital are distributed 
equally per capita. This could happen in two ways: all capital can be state-owned 
and the returns from it can be distributed equally among members of a 
community, or every member can have the same amount of (privately-owned) 
capital on which she receives the same return. Now, r>g will not be “transmitted” 
into greater inter-personal inequality simply because Gc=0. In such a society, we 
can write income of an individual i (𝑦𝑖) as 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑐̅  where labor income (or 
more realistically, log of labor income) l is distributed normally with the mean 𝑙  ̅ 
and standard deviation 𝜎𝑙  𝑙: 𝑁(𝑙 ̅, 𝜎𝑙) and income from capital is a constant. Rc will 
be equal to zero because the correlation between the ranks according to total 
income and amount of capital income one receives will be 0 and the denominator 
of (2),  𝜌(𝑟(𝑦), 𝑐), will be equal to zero.  
The same result obtains if we distribute capital randomly across individuals, 
regardless of their labor income. In that case, Gc will be positive, and individual 
income becomes 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖  where now both labor income (or log of labor 
income) and capital income (or log of capital income) are normally distributed 
with 𝑙: 𝑁(𝑙 ̅, 𝜎𝑙) and 𝑐: 𝑁(𝑐̅ , 𝜎𝑐) but are uncorrelated. The “transmission” will 
                                                          
6 The condition is 𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐 > 𝑅𝑙𝐺𝑙. 
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again fail because there would be no clear association between being a capitalist 
and having a higher overall income. Rc may be positive or negative (it will just 
depend on how the lottery of capital incomes gets correlated with the 
distribution of labor incomes) but it would be very small in the absolute amount. 
If Rc is positive, there would be a slight addition to inequality, if it is negative, a 
slight reduction of  inter-personal income inequality.  
In any case, the transmission from greater share of capital to inter-personal 
income distribution will be weak: nil or quasi nil across any value of sc. 7 This is 
shown in Figure 1 by the line denoted “socialism” which we draw to be almost 
undistinguishable from at Rc=0 for all values of sc. Basically, we have full 
independence of personal income distribution from the rising share of capital in 
net output.  The former is “insulated” from the latter.   
  
                                                          
7 sc is the same as Piketty’s alpha. 
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Figure 1. Transmission of rising capital share into inter-personal inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classical capitalism.  We consider next classical capitalism where 
ownerships of capital and labor are totally separated,  in the sense that workers 
draw their entire income from labor and have no income from the ownership of 
assets, while the situation for the capitalists is the reverse. Moreover, we shall 
assume that all workers are poorer than all capitalists. This gives us, as shown in 
Figure 2, two social groups, non-overlapping by income level. When the groups 
are non-overlapping, Gini is exactly decomposable across the recipients (see 
equation 3), and this simplifies the relationship between Gini calculated across 
income sources and Gini calculated across the recipients.  
  
1 
Correlation ratio (Rc) 
0 
Capital income share (sc) 
Socialism 
New capitalism 
Classical capitalism 
1 
US 2013 
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Figure 2. Social structure of classical capitalism (simplified) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, Gini calculated across recipients belonging to groups i (1,2,…r) is 
equal to 
𝐺 =
1
𝜇
∑ ∑(?̅?𝑗 − ?̅?𝑖)
𝑟
𝑖=1
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗
𝑟
𝑗>𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑖𝐺𝑖 + 𝐿
𝑟
𝑖=1
 
where μ = overall mean income, ?̅?𝑖  = mean income of i-th group, ?̅?𝑖 = 
population share of i-th group, 𝑠𝑖 = share of i-th group in total income, and L = the 
overlap term that is generally calculated as a residual and is positive when there 
are recipients from the mean-poorer group who are richer than (overlap with) 
some recipients of a mean-richer group. Since in our case all workers are poorer 
than all capitalists, L disappears and the expression for the Gini simplifies:   
𝐺 =
1
𝜇
(?̅?𝑘 − ?̅?𝑤)𝑝𝑘𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑘 + 𝑝𝑤𝑠𝑤𝐺𝑤 = 
= 𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑤 − 𝑠𝑤𝑝𝑘 + 𝑝𝑘𝑠𝑘𝐺𝑘 + 𝑝𝑤𝑠𝑤𝐺𝑤 = 𝑠𝑘(𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑘) + 𝑠𝑤(−𝑝𝑘 + 𝑝𝑤𝐺𝑤)   (3) 
where we use subscripts w for workers, and k for capitalists.  
Workers 
Capitalists 
Income (in logs) 
Number of 
people 
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Overall inequality, whether calculated across income sources or across 
recipients, must be the same, so (3) must be equal to (1), and thus 
𝑠𝑐(𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑐) + 𝑠𝑙(−𝑝𝑘 + 𝑝𝑤𝐺𝑙) = 𝑠𝑙𝑅𝑙𝐺𝑙 + 𝑠𝑐𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐      
𝑠𝑐(𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑐 − 𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐) + 𝑠𝑙(−𝑝𝑘 + 𝑝𝑤𝐺𝑙 − 𝑅𝑙𝐺𝑙) = 0                   (4) 
where we make use of the fact that the share of labor income (sl) is exactly 
the same as the share of income received by workers  (sw) and the share of capital 
income is equal to the share of income received by capitalists, sc = sk. Annex 
shows further manipulations of the relationship.  At the end we obtain  a positive 
and concave relationship between sc and Rc (as shown in Figure 1 by the curve 
denoted “classical capitalism”). The transmission from an increased capital share 
into a higher inter-personal inequality increases in sc  but does so at the 
diminishing rate. It asymptotically tends toward 1 when sc approaches unity. 
 Some intuition will help explain the result. Suppose that classical capitalism 
is such that there is only an infinitesimally small number of capitalists (at the 
extreme, just one person) and that all other individuals are workers so that sc is 
low. By assuming a sole capitalist we also assume that he/she is the richest 
person in the community. The correlation coefficient in the numerator of  Rc, 
cov(r(y), c),  will be low because ranks according to total income, running from 1 
to 100, will be not be correlated with the amount of income from capital. We 
shall have two vectors, that of ranks [1 2 3……n] and that of capital income [0 0 0 
0….K] where K=total capital income (received by one person only). Now, the 
denominator of Rc will be obtained from a correlation between a vector where 
the ranks for all recipients but the top will be the same (since they all have the 
same, nil, amount of income from capital), that is between a vector such as  
[
1
(𝑛)/2
,
1
(𝑛)/2
… . 𝑛] and [0 0 0..K]. Such a correlation will be much higher and the 
ratio between the two correlation coefficient will thus be low. We can illustrate it 
with a numerical example. Let n=100 and K any random number but which we 
selected to be 100. The correlation in the numerator is 0.17, that of the 
denominator 1. Hence Rc=0.17. 
Consider now the other extreme where classical capitalist society is 
composed mostly of capitalists and an infinitesimally small number of workers so 
that sc approaches unity. It is clear that person’s rank according to capital income 
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will entirely (or almost entirely) coincide with his rank according to total income, 
and cov(r(y), c) ≈ cov(r(y), y) and thus Rc ≈ 1. In other words, there would be 
practically no difference between total and capital income since at the limit they 
are the same. This makes the two correlation coefficients almost the same and 
their ratio Rc ≈ 1.  
New capitalism. We assume that new capitalism differs from the classical 
capitalism in that that all individuals receive income from both capital and labor. 
Thus, instead of two sharply delineated groups, workers with income (li,0) and 
capitalists with income (0,ci), we have for all individuals positive labor and capital 
incomes (li,ci).  We assume further that the amounts of both labor and capital 
income received increase monotonically as we move toward (total income-) richer 
individuals. A poor person’s income would be for example (2,1), middle-income 
person’s (7,3) and rich person’s income (24,53).  
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Figure 3. Labor and capital income across recipients in 
new capitalism (simplified) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monotonic increases of labor, capital and total income (such that if 𝑦𝑗 > 𝑦𝑖  
then we must have 𝑙𝑗 > 𝑙𝑖 and 𝑘𝑗 > 𝑘𝑖) ensure that the ranks according to capital, 
labor and total income are the same. Thus, Rc=Rl=1.  This is why in Figure 1 we 
draw the “transmission” function for new capitalism at Rc=1 throughout. 
However several elaborations of this situation are possible. For example, 
we can have a situation illustrated in Figure 3 by labor income and capital 
income2 lines: the proportions of labor and capital income stay constant 
throughout the distribution, that is, both amounts of capital and labor increase by 
the same percentage as we move from poorer to richer recipients. A person’s 
income can be written as 𝑦𝑖 = ϛ𝑖(𝑙 ̅ + 𝑐̅) where ϛi increases in i, indicating that 
everybody receives a specific portion of overall labor and capital income (the 
proportions of capital and labor are the same for each individual, but vary across 
individuals). In that case (let’s call it, “new capitalism 2”), Ginis of both labor and 
capital will be the same and the Gini coefficient of total income can be written as 
𝐺 = 𝑠𝑙?̅? + 𝑠𝑐?̅? = ?̅?                       (5)                 
Labor income 
Capital income2 
Recipients 
ranked by 
total income  
Income 
level (in 
logs) 
Poorest people Richest people 
Capital income1 
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When r>g and the share of capital income goes up overall inequality is 
unaffected. Thus, in the “new capitalism 2” where everybody (poor and rich alike) 
has the same proportions of capital and labor income, a rising share of capital 
income (like in socialism) does not get transmitted into an increased inter-
personal inequality. Note that happens because the rising capital share leaves 
Gini of capital income unchanged (and Gini of capital income is the same as Gini 
of labor income). In socialism,  it happens because Gc=0. 
A more realistic version of the new capitalism (named “new capitalism 1”) 
is the one where the proportion of capital income increases as person becomes  
(total-income) richer. This can be written (in a continuous case) as 
𝑑(
𝑐
𝑙
)
𝑑𝑦
> 0 with 
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑦
> 0  and 
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝑦
> 0  ensuring that incomes from both capital and labor are higher 
for richer individuals. 8 The relationship  cov(r(y), c) = cov (r(y),y) then still holds 
since the rankings according to total income and ranking according to capital 
income coincide, but now an increase in the capital share pushes the overall Gini 
up. This happens because capital income (depicted by capital income1 line in 
Figure 3) has a greater Gini than labor income and as the share of more unequally 
distributed source increases, so does the overall Gini. The actual increase in Gini 
will be Gc-Gl.    
 
New capitalism represents a strong departure from the model of classical 
capitalism.9 Every individual receives both labor and capital income, and in 
principle (if their shares were the same across the distribution), we could obtain 
the same outcome as in socialism, namely full orthogonality of personal income 
distribution from the rising share of capital income.  This however seems unlikely 
as rich countries today are in effect closer to “new capitalism 1”.    
 
Under “new capitalism 1” the transmission from increased capital share 
into greater inter-personal inequality may be as strong as in classical capitalism. 
                                                          
8 For the evidence on new capitalism, see Lakner and Atkinson (2014) who show an increasing association of high 
labor and capital income in the United States during the past half century.  Such a society is also evoked by Piketty 
(2013; Chapter 7, p. 416 in French edition). 
 
9 This is similar to the point repeatedly made by Piketty that the post-War period is distinguished by the 
emergence of a property-owning middle class even if its share has remained small (see Piketty, 2013, p. 410, 552).  
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Suppose that sc=0.3 and that it increases to 0.35. Under classical capitalism with 
Rc (say) around 0.6, these 5 additional percentage points of net income received 
by capitalists will increase overall Gini by about 3 points. Under the actually-
existing capitalism, the increase will be (Gc-Gl) times 5. The Gc-Gl  gap is empirically 
about 0.4-0.5 (0.8-0.9 minus 0.4-0.5), so the Gini increase may be 2-2.5 points. 
The new capitalism may be just marginally more  successful than classical 
capitalism in checking the spill-over from the rising capital share into a greater 
inter-personal inequality.  
 
An obvious but important point is that the transmission coefficient Ri shows 
the increase in personal income inequality that is associated with either a rising 
capital income share (while the Gini of capital income stays the same), or with a 
rising inequality in the distribution of capital income (while income share stays 
constant). Thus, every Gini point increase in the concentration of capital income 
will be translated into Rcsc Gini point increase in total income Gini. Similarly, as 
the share of capital in total income increases by a percentage point, Gini will go 
up by (Gc-Gl)Rc. The transmission coefficient Rc may be viewed as the (key 
component) of the  elasticity of personal income distribution to the changes in 
the share of capital income or to distribution of capital incomes.  
Some illustrative data. Figure 4 shows some actual data on the elasticity 
calculated for four  advanced economies. In addition to the United States, I 
selected Germany as an example of a continental-corporatist welfare state, 
Sweden as a prototype Scandinavian welfare state, and Spain as an advanced 
Mediterranean welfare state. Not surprisingly, the results show the US with the 
highest elasticity almost throughout. It registers moreover a steady increase, 
passing from 0.54 in the late 1970s to 0.64 in 2013. Most interesting however is 
Sweden where the elasticity was in the mid-1970s as low as 0.2 but increased to 
0.5 by 2000. This parallels the well-known increase in income, and especially 
wealth, inequality in Sweden (see OECD, 2015, Piketty 2013, p. 549).  German 
elasticity also increased significantly, from 0.4 to the peak of 0.65.  There was 
everywhere, over the past twenty years, an upward trend in the elasticity with 
which greater capital income share “seeps” into greater personal income 
inequality. The gaps between countries’ elasticities are now also smaller than they 
were in the 1970s.  
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Figure 4. Elasticity of inter-personal income Gini to changes in capital income 
share; advanced economies 1973-2013 
 
 
Source: calculated from household-level data available from Luxembourg Income Study. All underlying 
variables normalized by household size, that is expressed in per capita terms.  
 
 Table 1 summarizes the elasticities we obtain from the ideal-typical social 
systems and in real life. It also enables us to see better where, within  different 
ideal types, do modern capitalist economies lie. In the late 1970s, Germany, 
Sweden and Spain were quite close to the socialist model. But this was no longer 
the case by 2010-13. 10 
 
                                                          
10 Note that we cannot judge well how close they come to “new capitalism 2” because under “new capitalism 2” Rc 
would be still 1 although the transmission link between greater capital income share and inter-personal inequality 
is severed.  
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Table 1. Elasticity of transmission of rising share of capital income into personal 
income inequality 
 
Economic system Elasticity Gini change 
“New capitalism 1” (with 
Gc>Gl) 
Around 1 Gc-Gl 
Classical capitalism <1 <(Gc-Gl) 
Rich countries today 0.4-0.6 ~ ½ (Gc-Gl) 
“New capitalism 2” (with 
Gc=Gl)* 
0 0 
Socialism Around 0  Around 0 
* This despite the fact that Rc=1. 
 
4. Policy Implications  
The implication of this analysis is that the way the rising share of capital 
income gets transmitted into greater inter-personal inequality varies between 
different social systems in function of the underlying asset distribution. We are 
used to implicitly making the assumption that capital incomes are very 
concentrated and that the association between being capital-rich and overall-
income rich is very close. Both of these assumptions are reasonable given the 
empirical evidence. Indeed, as we see in the ideal-typical world of new capitalism, 
the increase in sc almost directly translates into a higher Gini. In the classical 
capitalism, this is also true once the share of capitalists becomes sufficiently high. 
But in a socialist world rising sc does not imply rising inter-personal Gini; in effect, 
given our assumption of equal per capita distribution of capital assets, it implies a 
reduction in income inequality. Similarly, in capitalism where capital and labor 
shares are equal across income distribution, rising capital share does not affect 
inter-personal income distribution.  
This carries, I think, clear lessons for the rich societies in particular. The 
definition of rich societies is that they have high K/Y (β) ratios. As currently 
advanced societies become even richer, the r>g dynamic will lead to the rising 
beta and alpha. One way to ensure that this does not spill out into increased 
income inequality is through taxation, as advocated by Piketty, but another way—
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perhaps a more promising one or at least a complementary—is to reduce the 
concentration of ownership of capital and thus of income from capital.   
In the framework discussed here, reduced Gc will also reduce the 
association between (high) capital income and (high) overall incomes. Both Gc and 
Rc would be reduced and an increase in alpha will have a small or even a minimal 
effect on personal income distribution. 
In turn, this means that greater attention should be paid to policies that 
would redistribute ownership of capital and make it less concentrated. In 
principle, there are two kinds of such policies: one would be giving greater 
importance to ESOPs and similar plans that would give a capital stake to workers 
who currently have none.  A well-known Swedish trade union plan that would 
have companies issue special shares to go into a fund which would support 
workers’ pensions was recently “resuscitated” by Taylor, Ömer and Rezai (2015, 
p. 23). This approach however runs into the well-known problem of non-
diversification of risk, where individuals’ income depends entirely on working in a 
given company. This is indeed the case for most people today who have only 
labor incomes, so having both labor and capital income coming from the same 
company, it could be argued, does not expose them to  more risk than they 
presently experience. While this may be true, it begs the question of why such 
pro-labor ownership would be introduced if it does not manifestly improve the 
situation of those who currently hold no capital assets. It therefore seems to me 
that this approach, while valuable, runs quickly into some limits. 
A more promising approach may be to focus on wider share ownership 
divorced from one’s workplace. This could be done through various incentives 
that would encourage small shareholdings, and penalize heavy concentration of 
assets. Indeed. Piketty’s suggestion of a progressive wealth tax could be 
combined with implicit and explicit subsidies to those who hold small amounts of 
wealth.  
In rich societies whose capital-output ratio will tend to rise, the share of 
capital income in net income may be expected to go up as well.11 If so, efforts 
should be directed toward ensuring that this inevitable upward movement in the 
K/Y ratio does not produce unsustainable levels of income inequality. A way to 
                                                          
11 Assuming some stickiness in the rate of return.  
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achieve this is to equalize as much as possible individuals’ positions at the pre-
distribution stage, or to put it in terms introduced in this paper to move away 
from “new capitalism 1”, which is in many ways similar to the actually-existing 
capitalism today, and closer to “new capitalism 2”. This involves primarily lesser 
concentration of capital assets, but also (a topic which I did not discuss here) 
more equal access to education and deconcentration of the returns to skills. 
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Annex. Derivation of the transmission function in the case of classical capitalism 
(with two non-overlapping income classes) 
 
𝑠𝑐(𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑐 − 𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐) = −𝑠𝑙(−𝑝𝑘 + 𝑝𝑤𝐺𝑙 − 𝑅𝑙𝐺𝑙) 
𝑠𝑐(𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑐 − 𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐) = −(1 − 𝑠𝑐)(−𝑝𝑘 + 𝑝𝑤𝐺𝑙 − 𝑅𝑙𝐺𝑙) 
𝑠𝑐(𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑐 − 𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐) = −(1 − 𝑠𝑐)(𝐴) 
𝑠𝑐(𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑐 − 𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐 − 𝐴) = −𝐴 
−𝑠𝑐𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐 = −𝑠𝑐(𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑐 − 𝐴) − 𝐴 
𝑠𝑐𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐 = 𝑠𝑐(𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑐 − 𝐴) + 𝐴 
𝑅𝑐𝐺𝑐 = (𝑝𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘𝐺𝑐 − 𝐴) +
𝐴
𝑠𝑐
 
𝑅𝑐 = (
𝑝𝑤 − 𝐴
𝐺𝑐
+ 𝑝𝑘) +
𝐴
𝑠𝑐𝐺𝑐
 
𝑑𝑅𝑐
𝑑𝑠𝑐
= −
𝐴
𝑠𝑐
1
𝐺𝑐
2 > 0 
Since 𝐴 =  −𝑝𝑘 + 𝑝𝑤𝐺𝑙 − 𝑅𝑙𝐺𝑙 = −(1 − 𝑝𝑤) + 𝑝𝑤𝐺𝑙 − 𝑅𝑙𝐺𝑙= 
𝑝𝑤(1 + 𝐺𝑙) − 1 − 𝑅𝑙𝐺𝑙  will tend to be negative.  In one extreme case when pk→1 
this would be clearly the case. In the other extreme case when pk→0, 𝐴 = 𝐺𝑙( 1 −
𝑅𝑙) → 0. This last case is clearly uirrelevant because it implies that there are no 
capitalists at all. But for all sensible situations where 0<pk<1, A<0.  
The second derivative is  
𝑑2𝑅𝑐
𝑑𝑠𝑐
2 =
2𝐴
𝑠𝑐
1
𝐺𝑐
3 < 0 
All symbols are as explained in the text.  
